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1 Introduction
In this paper, our aim is to lay a set of principles and methodologies which
may serve as foundations of a unifying theory of Mathematics. By this, we
mean a meta-theory offering methodologies for comparing different math-
ematical theories with each other, discovering analogies between them as
well as pointing out peculiarities, and, most importantly, providing effective
means for transferring results and techniques between distinct fields.
Mathematics is divided into several distinct areas: Algebra, Analysis,
Geometry, Topology, Number Theory etc. Each of these areas has evolved
throughout the years by developing its own ideas and techniques, and has
reached by now a remarkable degree of specialization. With time, various
connections between the areas have been discovered, leading in some cases
to the creation of actual ‘bridges’ between different mathematical branches;
many times methods of one field have been employed to derive results in
another, and this interplay of different points of view in a same subject
has always had a fundamental role in illuminating the nature of concepts,
establishing new results and suggesting new lines of investigation.
The profound reasons behind the analogies and connections between dif-
ferent fields are best understood in the context of Mathematical Logic; in-
deed, Logic provides a means for formalizing any kind of mathematical con-
cept, so that the investigation of the relationships between different theories
can be carried out at a completely rigorous level.
Considered the importance of building bridges between distinct math-
ematical branches, it would be highly desirable that Logic would not just
serve as a tool for analyzing analogies already discovered in Mathematics
but could instead play an active role in identifying new connections between
existing fields, as well as suggesting new directions of mathematical inves-
tigation. As it happens, we now have enough mathematical tools at our
disposal for trying to achieve this goal.
By providing a system in which all the usual mathematical concepts
can be expressed rigorously, Set Theory has represented the first serious
attempt of Logic to unify Mathematics at least at the level of language.
Later, Category Theory offered an alternative abstract language in which
most of Mathematics can be formulated and, as such, has represented a fur-
ther advancement towards the goal of ‘unifying Mathematics’. Anyway, both
these systems realize a unification which is still limited in scope, in the sense
that, even though each of them provides a way of expressing and organizing
Mathematics in one single language, they do not offer by themselves effective
methods for an actual transfer of knowledge between distinct fields. On the
other hand, the principles that we will sketch in the present paper define a
different and more substantial approach to the unification of Mathematics.
Our methodologies are based on a new view of Grothendieck toposes
as unifying spaces which can serve as ‘bridges’ for transferring informa-
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tion, ideas and results between distinct mathematical theories. This view
of toposes has emerged in the course of the Ph.D. investigations carried out
by the author at the University of Cambridge from 2006 to 2009, and in
fact the results in [2] provide compelling technical evidence for the validity
of such view (indeed, it is also among the purposes of the present paper to
serve as a ‘conceptual guide’ to the methods in the author’s dissertation).
In this paper, I give an outline of the fundamental principles charac-
terizing my view of toposes as ‘bridges’ connecting different mathematical
theories and describe the general methodologies which have arisen from such
a view and which have motivated my investigations so far. The analysis will
be complemented by the discussion of the results in [2] which best illustrate
the application of the above-mentioned principles. These principles are ab-
stract and transversal to the various mathematical fields, and the application
of them can lead to a huge amount of surprising and non-trivial results in
any area of Mathematics, so we hope that the reader will get motivated to
try out these methods in his or her fields of interest.
2 Geometric theories and their classifying toposes
In this section we discuss the background on geometric theories and classi-
fying toposes which is necessary for the following parts of the paper (for a
comprehensive source of information on the subject we refer the reader to
Part D of [5]).
2.1 Geometric theories
Geometric theories are a wide class of (multi-sorted) infinitary first-order
theories. Recall that a theory over a signature Σ is geometric if its axioms
can be presented in the form ∀~x(φ ⇒ ψ), where φ and ψ are geometric
formulae over Σ (i.e. formulae with a finite number of free variables built up
from atomic formulae over Σ by only using finitary conjunctions, infinitary
disjunctions, and existential quantifications) in the context ~x. The axioms of
geometric theories are often presented in sequent form, that is one writes φ `~x
ψ instead of (∀~x)(φ⇒ψ). If in the above-mentioned definition of geometric
theory we replace ‘infinitary disjunctions’ with ‘finitary disjunctions’, we get
the class of theories known as coherent theories.
The attribute ‘geometric’ should not induce the reader to think that this
is a class of theories which have something particular to do with Geome-
try (apart from the first historical applications); the concept is completely
general and geometric theories can be found in essentially every field of
Mathematics.
Indeed, it is a matter of fact that most of the theories naturally arising in
Mathematics have a geometric axiomatization (over their signature). Any-
way, if a finitary first-order theory T is not geometric, we can canonically
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construct a coherent theory over a larger signature, called the Morleyiza-
tion of T, whose models in the category Set of sets (more generally, in any
Boolean coherent category) can be identified with those of T (cfr. Lemma
D1.5.13 [5]).
The notion of Morleyization is important because it enables us to study
any kind of first-order theory by using the methods of Topos Theory. In
fact, we can expect many important properties of first-order theories to be
naturally expressible as properties of their Morleyizations, and these latter
properties to be in turn expressible in terms of ‘invariants’ of their classifying
toposes. For example, a first-order theory is complete if and only if its
Morleyization T′ satisfies the following property: any coherent (equivalently,
geometric) sentence over its signature is provably equivalent to ⊥ or to >,
but not both; and this property is precisely equivalent to saying that its
classifying topos is two-valued.
Due to its infinitary nature, geometric logic is quite expressive; impor-
tant mathematical properties which are not expressible in finitary first-order
logic (over a given signature) often admit a geometric axiomatization. For
example, the property of an element of a commutative ring with unit to be
nilpotent is well-known not to be expressible by a finitary first-order formula
over the signature of rings, but it is obviously expressible as a geometric for-
mula over this signature. An interesting infinitary geometric theory, which
was studied topos-theoretically in [4], is the theory of fields of finite char-
acteristic which are algebraic over their prime fields. Another example of a
geometric theory which is not finitary first-order is given by the theory of
torsion abelian groups.
Geometric theories, including the infinitary ones, should definitely be
regarded as objects which are worth of investigation. The infinitary nature of
geometric logic has surely represented an obstacle towards the recognition of
this class of theories as a subject of primary importance; in fact, one cannot in
general employ the methods of classical model theory for studying geometric
theories, and therefore methods of completely different nature must be used.
As we shall see in section 3, from the point of view of Topos Theory the
finiteness assumptions on the nature of the logic indeed appear to be very
unnatural restrictions; even starting with finitary theories, studying them
topos-theoretically often leads to the consideration of infinitary ones. The
logic underlying Grothendieck toposes is geometric logic, in its full infinitary
nature (cfr. section 3); and, as we shall argue below, Topos Theory provides
a set of incredibly powerful techniques for studying geometric theories.
We emphasize that geometric theories, as any kind of first-order theories,
are objects of purely syntactic nature. As in classical finitary first-order logic
we have a syntactic notion of provability of first-order sentences (relative to
a theory), so we have a natural proof system for geometric (resp. coher-
ent) logic, described in terms of inference rules involving geometric (resp.
coherent) sequents, which yields a notion of provability of geometric (resp.
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coherent) sequents relative to a given geometric (resp. coherent) theory. In
geometric logic, classical and intuitionistic provability of geometric sequents
coincide, so we can well omit the law of excluded middle from these proof
systems without affecting the corresponding notion of provability. We refer
the reader to Part D of [5] for a detailed presentation of these systems.
It is well-known that first-order languages can always be interpreted in
the context of (a given model of) set theory. In fact, these languages can also
be meaningfully interpreted in a category, provided that the latter possesses
enough categorical structure to allow the interpretation of the connectives
and quantifiers arising in the formulae of the language (in this categorical
semantics sorts are interpreted as objects, terms as arrows and formulae as
subobjects, in a way that respects the logical structure of compound expres-
sions); this leads, under the same assumptions, to a notion of satisfaction
of sequents in a categorical structure, and hence to a notion of model of a
first-order theory in a category, which specializes, in the case of the category
of sets, to the classical Tarskian definition of (set-based) model of a first-
order theory. For example, a topological group can be seen as a model of the
theory of groups in the category of topological spaces, and a sheaf of rings
on a topological space X can be seen as a model of the theory of rings in
the topos Sh(X). This categorical semantics, when it is defined, is always
sound with respect to the above-mentioned proof systems, provided that the
latter do not contain the law of excluded middle.
Grothendieck toposes are a wide class of categories in which we can in-
terpret geometric logic, and in fact they provide us with a strong form of
completeness for geometric theories. Indeed, for any geometric theory T,
there is a Grothendieck topos Set[T], namely the classifying topos of T,
which contains a conservative model of T (i.e. a model UT such that the
geometric sequents provable in T are exactly those which are satisfied in
UT), which is moreover universal in the sense that any model of T in a
Grothendieck topos arises, up to isomorphism, as the image of UT under the
inverse image functor of a (unique up to equivalence) geometric morphism of
toposes from the topos in which the model lives to the classifying topos (cfr.
section 2.2 below). We remark that, due to their infinitary nature, geometric
theories do not in general enjoy a classical form of completeness i.e. it is not
in general true that a sequent which is valid in all the set-based models of a
geometric theory is provable in the theory by using geometric logic. Anyway,
as we have said, the concept of universal model of a geometric theory yields
a strong form of completeness, and in fact we believe that it should be taken
as the fundamental tool (replacing the standard ones) in the investigation of
the aspects of completeness of the theory (cfr. sections 2.2 and 3).
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2.2 Classifying toposes
A classifying topos of a geometric theory T over a signature Σ is a
Grothendieck topos Set[T] such that for any Grothendieck topos E the cat-
egory Geom(E ,Set[T]) of geometric morphisms from E to Set[T] is equiva-
lent to the category of models of T in the topos E , naturally in E ; naturality
means that for any geometric morphism f : E → F of Grothendieck toposes,
we have a commutative square
Geom(F ,Set[T])
−◦f

' // T-mod(F)
T-mod(f∗)

Geom(E ,Set[T])
' // T-mod(E)
in the (meta-)category of categories CAT.
Recall that geometric morphisms are the natural, topologically moti-
vated, notion of morphism between Grothendieck toposes; indeed, the as-
signment sending a locale L to the topos of sheaves Sh(L) on it gives rise
to a full and faithful functor from the category of locales to the category of
Grothendieck toposes and geometric morphisms between them, which iden-
tifies the former category as a full reflective subcategory of the latter.
The classifying topos of a geometric theory T can be seen as a representing
object for the T-model (pseudo-)functor
T-mod : BTopop → CAT
from the opposite of the category BTop of Grothendieck toposes to the
(meta-)category of categories CAT which assigns
• to a topos E the category T-mod(E) of models of T in E and
• to a geometric morphism f : E → F the functor
T-mod(f∗) : T-mod(F)→ T-mod(E)
sending a modelM ∈ T-mod(F) to its image f∗(M) under the inverse
image functor f∗ of f .
In particular, classifying toposes are unique up to categorical equivalence.
A concept which is strictly connected with that of classifying topos is
that of universal model. A universal model of a geometric theory T is a
model UT of T in a Grothendieck topos G such that for any T-model M in a
Grothendieck topos F there exists a unique (up to isomorphism) geometric
morphism fM : F → G such that f
∗
M(UT)
∼= M .
By the (2-dimensional) Yoneda Lemma, if a topos G contains a universal
model of a geometric theory T then G satisfies the universal property of the
classifying topos of T. Conversely, if a topos E classifies a geometric theory
T then E contains a universal model of T.
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Therefore universal models, as well as classifying toposes, are uniquely
determined up to categorical equivalence. Specifically, if M and N are uni-
versal models of a geometric theory T lying respectively in toposes F and
G then there exists a unique (up to isomorphism) geometric equivalence be-
tween F and G such that its inverse image functors send M and N to each
other (up to isomorphism).
Classifying toposes of arbitrary first-order theories do not in general exist,
for the essential reason that inverse image functors of geometric morphisms
may not preserve the interpretation of implications and universal quantifi-
cations (even though they always preserve the interpretation of geometric
formulae). On the other hand, classifying toposes always exist for geometric
theories, and they can be built canonically from them by means of a syntactic
construction (cfr. section 4 below). This fact is of fundamental importance,
at least for our purposes, and we shall extensively discuss it below.
We remark that the mere existence of classifying toposes is alone a fact
of primary conceptual importance; the fact that the T-model functor is rep-
resentable means that, in a sense, all the information about the functor or,
in other words, about the categories of models of the theory T, is condensed
in one single object, namely the classifying topos. This clearly represents
a ‘symmetry’ result within the model theory of geometric theories, which
demonstrates that the environment of Grothendieck toposes enjoys a strong
form of ‘inner completeness’ with respect to geometric theories: all the mod-
els of a given geometric theory in Grothendieck toposes, including all the
classical set-based models of the theory, are images of a single ‘universal
model’ lying in its classifying topos, in which the integration of syntactic and
semantic aspects of theory takes place. If we restrict our considerations to
the set-based models of a theory T, we do not have a similar representability
result: we have to expand our view, for example to the world of Grothendieck
toposes, in order to find this kind of ‘symmetry’. After all, this kind of phe-
nomenon is quite common in Mathematics; think for example that, before
the invention of the complex plane, analysts were having a hard time trying
to understand the behaviour of solutions to polynomial equations in the real
line, while as soon as ‘the natural environment’ for polynomial equations
was eventually found, everything started to be perceived under a new light,
and people immediately stopped wondering why the behaviour of polyno-
mial equations in the real line appeared so erratic. In fact, the fundamental
theorem of algebra perfectly embodies this achieved ‘symmetry’ with respect
to polynomial equations.
A familiar image that comes to mind in thinking about this is that of a
sun and the shadows that is generates. Shadows arise when the light of the
sun meets some form of solid matter; similarly, models arise when a piece
of syntax is interpreted in a given ‘concrete’ environment. For example, the
abstract, syntactic, notion of group gives rise to many different models in
different categories, namely the classical notion of group (if we interpret it
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in the category of sets), the notion of topological group (if we interpret it
in the category of topological spaces), the notion of algebraic group (if we
interpret it in the category of algebraic varieties), the notion of Lie group (if
we interpret it in the category of smooth manifolds), etc.
As shadows are easily comparable with each other, if one bears in mind
that they ultimately come from a unique source, so the study of models of a
theory can be very much aided by the consideration of the syntactic aspects
of the theory. For example, all the abstract algebraic properties of groups (in
the sense of algebraic identities which are provable in the axiomatic theory
of groups) can be canonically interpreted in all of the above-mentioned cat-
egories to ‘automatically’ yield new results on topological groups, algebraic
groups, Lie groups etc. All of these notions share a common core which lies
at the syntactic level rather than at the semantical one.
As the sun is a unifying source of shadows, syntax plays the role of
a unifying concept among mathematical structures. This is perhaps not
particularly visible in the traditional setting of classical (first-order) model
theory, where we have a completeness theorem for finitary first-order logic
providing an equivalence between the syntactic viewpoint and the semantical
one based on set theory. But when one has many semantics available, as in
topos-based model theory, syntax clearly acquires a prominent role.
3 The logic underlying Grothendieck toposes
We know that every geometric theory over a given signature has a classify-
ing topos, which is uniquely determined up to categorical equivalence. This
naturally leads to wondering whether this assignment is a sort of injection
or surjection, that is to raising the following questions:
(1) Can two different geometric theories have equivalent classifying
toposes?
(2) Is every Grothendieck topos the classifying topos of some geometric
theory?
The answers to both these questions are well-known. Specifically, it im-
mediately follows from the characterization of the classifying topos as a rep-
resenting object for the pseudofunctor of models (cfr. section 2.2), that two
geometric theories have equivalent classifying toposes if and only if they have
equivalent categories of models in every Grothendieck topos E , naturally in
E . Two such theories are said to be Morita-equivalent. (We will come back
to the subject of Morita-equivalence in section 5 below.) This answers the
first question.
To answer the second question, we need to go slightly deeper into the
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structure of Grothendieck toposes. By definition, a Grothendieck topos is
any (category equivalent to a) category Sh(C, J) of sheaves on a site (C, J)
(a site of definition of a Grothendieck topos E is any site (C, J) such that
the category Sh(C, J) of sheaves on (C, J) is equivalent to E); recall that a
site (C, J) consists of a small category C and a Grothendieck topology J on
C (we refer the reader to [6] for a first introduction to Topos Theory).
Notice that there is an element of ‘non-canonicity’ here, in that we cannot
expect the topos Sh(C, J) to uniquely determine the site (C, J); however,
this aspect of ‘non-canonicity’ is in many respects not at all an undesirable
feature, and in fact it represents a fundamental ingredient of the view of
toposes as unifying spaces described below.)
Recall that, given a site (C, J), for every Grothendieck topos E we have
an equivalence between the category Geom(E ,Sh(C, J)) of geometric mor-
phisms from E to Sh(C, J)) and the category FlatJ(C, E) of J-continuous
flat functors from C to E , naturally in E . Now, we can construct a geometric
theory TCJ such that its models in any Grothendieck topos E can be identified
precisely with the J-continuous flat functors from C to E (and the homomor-
phisms of TCJ -models can be identified with natural transformations between
the corresponding flat functors); clearly, TCJ will be classified by the topos
Sh(C, J). We call such theory TCJ the theory of J-continuous flat functors
on C. This ensures that every Grothendieck topos arises as the classifying
topos of some geometric theory, answering positively to the second question.
It is instructive to write down explicitly an axiomatization of the theory TCJ .
The signature of TCJ has one sort pAq for each object A of C, and one
function symbol pfq : pAq → pBq for each arrow f : A → B in C. The
axioms of TCJ are the following (to indicate that a variable x has sort pAq
we write xA):
(> `x (pfq(x) = x)) (1)
for any identity arrow f in C;
(> `x (pfq(x) = phq(pgq(x)))) (2)
for any triple of arrows f, g, h of C such that f is equal to the composite h◦g;
> `[] ∨
A∈Ob(C)
(∃xA)> (3)
(where the disjunction ranges over all the objects of C);
(> `xA,yB ∨
A
f
←C
g
→B
(∃zC)(pfq(zC) = xA ∧ pgq(zC) = yB)) (4)
for any objects A, B of C (where the disjunction ranges over all the cones
A
f
← C
g
→ B on the discrete diagram given by the pair of objects A and B);
(pfq(xA) = pgq(xA) `xA ∨
h:C→A∈Eq(f,g)
(∃zC)(phq(zC) = xA)) (5)
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for any pair of arrows f, g : A→ B in C with common domain and codomain
(where the disjunction ranges over all the arrows h which equalize f and g);
(> `xA∨
i∈I
(∃yBii )(pfiq(y
Bi
i ) = x
A)) (6)
for each J-covering family (fi : Bi → A | i ∈ I).
Notice that the first two groups of axioms express functoriality, the third,
fourth and fifth together express flatness (in terms of filteredness of the cor-
responding category of elements), while the sixth group of axioms expresses
J-continuity.
We remark that, even when C is cartesian, in which case flat functors on C
have a finitary (coherent) axiomatization, the presence of the Grothendieck
topology J makes the axiomatization of TCJ in general infinitary. This shows
that the ‘underlying logic’ of Grothendieck toposes is indeed geometric logic,
in its full infinitary nature. Further evidence for this is provided by the
duality theorem (cfr. section 8), which asserts that the subtoposes of the
classifying topos of a geometric theory correspond bijectively with the ge-
ometric quotients of the theory. In fact, as we shall see below, most of
the classical topos-theoretic invariants or constructions behave quite natu-
rally with respect to geometric logic (that is, they correspond to natural
properties or operations on geometric theories), but rather awkwardly with
respect to the finitary fragment of it i.e. coherent logic. Indeed, many impor-
tant topos-theoretic constructions yield, even if applied to coherent theories,
theories which are no longer coherent, a clear indication that these topos-
theoretically induced transformations of theories can be naturally studied
only in the full infinitary framework. Another illustration of the intrinsi-
cally geometric nature of the logic underlying Grothendieck toposes is given
by the consideration of universal models of geometric theories; by Theorem
7.1.4 [2], the subobjects (of an underlying object of) the universal model of
a geometric theory can be identified with the (provable-equivalence classes
of) geometric formulae in a given context over the signature of the theory.
In this connection, it seems illuminating also to recall the intrinsic char-
acterization of geometric logic obtained in [3]:
Theorem 3.1. Let Σ be a signature and S be a collection of Σ-structures
in Grothendieck toposes closed under isomorphisms of structures. Then S
is the collection of all models in Grothendieck toposes of a geometric theory
over Σ if and only if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(i) for any geometric morphism f : F → E, if M is in S then f∗(M) is in
S;
(ii) for any (set-indexed) jointly surjective family {fi : Ei → E | i ∈ I} of
geometric morphisms and any Σ-structure M in E, if f∗i (M) is in S
for every i ∈ I then M is in S.
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4 One topos, many sites
The classifying topos of a geometric theory can always be built ‘canonically’
from the theory by means of a syntactic construction: specifically, the classi-
fying topos of a theory T is given by the category of sheaves on the geometric
syntactic site (CT, JT) of T. Recall that the geometric syntactic category CT
of a geometric theory T over a signature Σ has as objects the ‘renaming-
equivalence classes’ of geometric formulae-in-context {~x . φ} over Σ and as
arrows [θ] : {~x . φ} → {~y . ψ} the T-provable equivalence classes of geo-
metric formulae [θ] which are T-provably functional from {~x . φ} to {~y . ψ},
while the geometric syntactic topology JT of T is the canonical Grothendieck
topology on the geometric category CT (cfr. Part D of [5] for more details).
If the theory T lies in a smaller fragment of geometric logic, such as
cartesian, regular or coherent logic, the classifying topos can be alterna-
tively calculated by taking the category of sheaves on other syntactic sites,
namely the cartesian syntactic category Ccart
T
of T equipped with the trivial
Grothendieck topology on it (if T is cartesian), the regular syntactic site
(Creg
T
, JCreg
T
) (if T is regular), and the coherent syntactic site (Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) (if
T is coherent).
So, for a given theory, there may be alternative ways of calculating its
classifying topos, even remaining in the context of syntactic sites: for exam-
ple, if a theory is cartesian, by regarding it as a cartesian, regular, coherent
and geometric theory, we obtain four different ‘syntactic sites’ such that the
category of sheaves on them yields the classifying topos of the theory. This
fact will be exploited in section 9.3 to derive various results in Logic.
On the other hand, there is an alternative general method, of semantical
nature, for calculating classifying toposes of geometric theories, based on the
notion of theory of presheaf type. A theory is said to be of presheaf type
if it is classified by a presheaf topos. The class of theories of presheaf type
contains all the cartesian theories, as well as many other significant theories
(we refer the reader to section 9.1 for a more extensive discussion on the
subject of theories of presheaf type). The classifying topos of a theory of
presheaf type T is given by the functor category [f.p.T-mod(Set),Set], where
f.p.T-mod(Set) is the category of (representatives of isomorphism classes of)
finitely presentable models of T.
Now, if a geometric theory is a quotient (i.e. a theory obtained by adding
geometric sequents over the same signature) of a theory of presheaf type
T then its classifying topos is a subtopos Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, J) of the
classifying topos [f.p.T-mod(Set),Set] of T, and the Grothendieck topology
J can be calculated directly by rearranging the axioms of the theory in a
particular form involving the formulae which present a (finitely presentable)
model of T (cfr. Chapter 5 of [2] for more details).
Compared with the above-mentioned method via syntactic sites, this
latter method of construction of classifying toposes is semantical in spirit,
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even though, for any theory of presheaf type T, the category f.p.T-mod(Set)
can be identified with the opposite of a full subcategory of the geometric
syntactic category of T (cfr. Theorem 10.3.3 [2] or section 9.1 below).
Of course, there are many other methods to prove that a certain
Grothendieck topos classifies a given geometric theory; sometimes, one can
directly prove that the models of the geometric theory can be identified
(naturally in any Grothendieck topos) with flat J-continuous functors on a
small category C, in which case one conclude the classifying topos of the
theory is the topos Sh(C, J) of sheaves on the site (C, J). Also, by working
with toposes, one is often able to prove the equivalence of a topos presented
in terms of one site with a topos presented by using a different site; and,
since the notion of classifying topos is clearly invariant under categorical
equivalence, this can lead to many different ‘presentations’ of the classifying
topos of a given theory.
Another source of different sites of definition for the classifying topos of
a geometric theory comes from the consideration of quotients of geometric
theories. By the duality theorem (cfr. section 8 below), quotients of a
geometric theory T can be identified with the subtoposes of the classifying
topos of T. Now, the notion of subtopos is a topos-theoretic invariant (i.e.
it depends only on the topos and not on the particular sites of definitions
of it) which behaves quite naturally with respect to sites (indeed, for any
site (C, J), the subtoposes of the topos Sh(C, J) correspond bijectively with
the Grothendieck topologies on C which contain J); hence, any particular
representation of the classifying topos of a geometric theory yields a related
representation of the classifying topos of any quotient of it.
We can think of each site of definition of the classifying topos of a geo-
metric theory as representing a particular aspect of the theory, and of the
classifying topos as embodying those essential features of the theory which
are invariant with respect to particular (syntactic) presentations of the the-
ory which induce Morita-equivalences at the semantical level. We shall come
back to this point in sections 4 and 6 below.
We emphasize that there can be really very many different sites of defi-
nition for a given Grothendieck topos (the logical interpretation of this fact
is central for our purposes and will be discussed in section 5). Often, just
looking at the same theory in two different ways leads to two different repre-
sentations of its classifying topos. For example, the coherent theory of fields
can be clearly presented both as a quotient of the theory of commutative
rings with unit and as a quotient of the theory of von Neumann regular
rings, and each of these presentations produces a different representation of
the classifying topos (as a category of sheaves on the opposite of the category
of finitely presented rings and as a category of sheaves on the opposite of the
category of finitely presented von Neumann regular rings). This technical
‘flexibility’ of the theory of toposes in accommodating and extracting the
mathematical substance of the apparently immaterial experience of ‘looking
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at the same thing in two - or more - different ways’ is one of the most strik-
ing aspects of the theory. As we shall argue below, an incredible amount of
information relevant for classical mathematics is ‘hidden’ inside toposes and
can be extracted by using their different sites of definition.
5 Morita-equivalences
We have seen in section 3 that two geometric theories have equivalent clas-
sifying toposes if and only if they are Morita-equivalent. Notice that the
relation ‘to be Morita-equivalent to each other’ defines an equivalence re-
lation on the collection of all geometric theories, and Grothendieck toposes
can be taken as canonical representatives of the resulting equivalence classes.
Theories which are Morita-equivalent to each other are, broadly speaking,
theories which, albeit possibly having a different linguistic (i.e. syntactic)
presentation, share a common ‘semantical core’, this core being precisely
embodied by their common classifying topos.
Morita-equivalence is a general notion of equivalence of mathematical
theories which is ubiquitous in Mathematics (even though there has not been
much interest in the past in identifying Morita-equivalences possibly due to
the lack of a general theory ascribing central importance to this notion and
demonstrating its technical usefulness - one of the purposes of the present
paper is in fact to advocate the extreme importance of investigations in
this area, cfr. sections 6 and 10). As a simple example of theories which
are Morita-equivalent, one can take the theory of Boolean algebras and the
theory of Boolean rings.
From the point of view of the logician, it is quite natural to wish to
regard as equivalent two mathematical theories whose (categories of) set-
based models can be identified with each other; the difference between this
notion of equivalence and the notion of Morita-equivalence is simply that in
the latter case we require the identification of the models of the two theories
to ‘carry over’ to any Grothendieck topos E , naturally in E . This might
seem at first sight a very severe constraint; but in fact, we can expect most
of the equivalences of the first kind which arise in mathematical practice to be
extensible to Morita-equivalences. The reason for this is that, in establishing
an equivalence of the first kind, one generally uses standard set-theoretic
constructions which do not involve the law of excluded middle, and, since
a Grothendieck topos behaves logically as a ‘generalized universe of sets’ in
which one can perform most of the classical set-theoretic constructions with
the only significant exception of arguments requiring the law of excluded
middle, we can naturally expect to be able to ‘lift’ such equivalence to an
arbitrary Grothendieck topos in such a way to globally obtain a Morita-
equivalence.
What may perhaps be a bit surprising is that theories of continuous flat
functors indeed play a central role into the intrinsically logical subject of
Morita-equivalence (cfr. below), also considered that their axiomatizations
are fairly bizarre according to the standards of classical model theory (sig-
natures with a possibly infinite number of sorts, infinitary disjunctions etc.).
Indeed, (C, J) is a site of definition for the classifying topos of a geometric
theory T if and only if T is Morita-equivalent to the theory of J-continuous
flat functors on C. In particular, any geometric theory is Morita-equivalent,
in a canonical way, to a theory of J-continuous flat functors on C, namely
the theory of JT-continuous flat functors on CT.
The notion of Morita-equivalence is also directly connected with that of
biinterpretability in classical model theory: in fact, two geometric theories
are Morita-equivalent if and only if they are biinterpretable in each other in
a generalized sense (a geometric morphism between the classifying toposes of
two geometric theories can be regarded as a generalized interpretation of one
theory into the other, cfr. section 2.1.5 [2]). If the theories are coherent this
precisely amounts to saying that their syntactic pretoposes are equivalent,
which is again a generalized notion of biinterpretability.
The subject of Morita-equivalence is strictly related to the existence of
different sites of definition for a given topos. Indeed, two sites (C, J) and
(C′, J ′) give rise to the same topos (i.e. Sh(C, J) is equivalent to Sh(C′, J ′))
if and only if the theories of J-continuous flat functors on C and of J ′-
continuous flat functors on C′ are Morita-equivalent; on the other hand, two
different mathematical theories which are Morita-equivalent to each other
yield different sites of definition of their classifying topos, namely their syn-
tactic sites. In light of this link with the notion of site and of the discussions
in section 4, we can say that the notion of Morita-equivalence indeed cap-
tures much of the intuitive idea of ‘looking at the same thing in different
ways’. (Notice that a theory alone generates an infinite number of Morita-
equivalences: as we remarked in section 4, just looking at a theory as a
quotient of one theory or another leads to a new site of definition for its
classifying topos i.e. to a Morita-equivalence.) In fact, a given mathemat-
ical property can manifest itself in several different forms in the context of
mathematical theories which have a common ‘semantical core’ but a dif-
ferent linguistic presentation; the remarkable fact is that if the property is
formulated as a topos-theoretic invariant on some topos then the expression
of it in terms of the different theories classified by the topos is determined
to a great extent by the technical relationship between the topos and the
different sites of definition for it (cfr. section 6).
In connection with this, it seems illuminating to remark that humans
have a natural tendency to visualize the ‘semantics’ and to use the ‘syntax’
to reason linguistically about it; so ‘looking at the same thing in different
ways’ may well be taken to mean ‘describing a given structure by using
different languages’. In fact, it often happens in Mathematics (as well as
in real life) that the languages and methods used to study some particular
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object may differ so much from person to person that it could become very
difficult to identify that in fact the actual object of study is the same.
To sum up, the fact that different theories are Morita-equivalent to each
other translates topos-theoretically in the existence of different sites of def-
inition for one classifying topos. At this point, one might naturally wonder
if this link with the notion of site is of any usefulness for the investigation
of Morita-equivalences. Actually, the main purpose of this paper is to give
a positive answer to this question, on the strength of our new methodolo-
gies of topos-theoretic nature for investigating Morita-equivalences. These
methodologies, which we will present in the course of the paper, are based on
a view of toposes as ‘bridges’ that can be used for transferring information
between theories that are Morita-equivalent to each other, and the notion
of site plays a central role in this view (cfr. section 6 below). In fact, these
methods provide a set of techniques for ‘unifying Mathematics’ in the sense
of identifying new connections between distinct mathematical theories and
translating ideas and results between them.
6 Toposes as ‘bridges’
We have already remarked that there can be many different sites of definition
for a given Grothendieck topos, and that this corresponds at the logical level
to existence of Morita-equivalences between theories classified by that topos.
So, while the assignment of the topos Sh(C, J) to a site (C, J) is a perfectly
canonical process, finding a theory classified by a given Grothendieck topos
is not at all canonical in general, since it corresponds to finding a small
site of definition for the topos: many different sites are sent, via the sheaf
construction, to the same topos (up to categorical equivalence). The oper-
ation (C, J) → Sh(C, J) of taking sheaves on a given site thus appears as
a sort of ‘coding’ which extracts exactly those essential features of the the-
ories classified by that topos which are invariant under Morita-equivalence.
In a sense, classifying toposes embody the ‘common features’ of geometric
theories which are Morita-equivalent to each other.
In fact, in view of the above-mentioned considerations, it would not even
make sense to look for a ‘privileged’ site of definition of a given Grothendieck
topos, since this would correspond to a way of canonically selecting a theory
out of a Morita-equivalence class, and this is a priori an irrational demand,
since there is no reason for why one should in general prefer one theory over
another (in general, it clearly does not make sense to affirm the ‘superiority’
of one branch of Mathematics over another - all that one can rationally say
is that a certain kind of language could be more appropriate than another
in given context, but these are subjective and contingent considerations).
Specifically, since the classifying topos of a geometric theory T can be
taken as a canonical representative for the equivalence class of theories which
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are Morita-equivalent to T (cfr. section 4), properties of T which are invari-
ant with respect to Morita-equivalence are, at least conceptually, proper-
ties of the classifying topos of T; conversely, any property of the classifying
topos of T gives rise to a property of the theories classified by it which is
invariant under Morita-equivalence. Technically, considered the richness and
flexibility of topos-theoretic methods, we can expect these properties of ge-
ometric theories which are invariant under Morita-equivalence to be in most
cases expressible as invariant properties of their classifying toposes written
in topos-theoretic language.
Now, the fundamental idea is the following: if we are able to express a
property of a given geometric theory as a property of its classifying topos then
we can attempt to express this property in terms of any of the other theories
having the same classifying topos, so to obtain a relation between the original
property and a new property of a different theory which is Morita-equivalent
to it. The classifying topos thus acts as a sort of ‘bridge’ connecting different
mathematical theories that are Morita-equivalent to each other, which can
be used to transfer information and results from one theory to another. The
purpose of the present paper is to show that this idea of toposes as unifying
spaces is technically very feasible; the great amount and variety of results
in the Ph.D. thesis [2] give clear evidence for the fruitfulness of this point
of view and, as we shall argue in the course of the paper, a huge number of
new insights into any field of Mathematics can be obtained as a result of the
application of these techniques.
Indeed, the fact that different mathematical theories can have equivalent
classifying toposes translates into the existence of different sites of definition
for one topos. Topos-theoretic invariants (i.e. properties of toposes which
are invariant under categorical equivalence) can then be used to transfer
properties from one theory to another. As we shall see in section 7, this is
made possible by the fact that the abstract relationship between a site (C, J)
and the topos Sh(C, J) which it ‘generates’ is often very natural (in the sense
that properties of sites technically relate to topos-theoretic invariants in a
natural way), enabling us to easily transfer invariants across different sites.
Notice that, since the construction of the category of sheaves Sh(C, J) from
a site (C, J) is entirely canonical, a property of the topos Sh(C, J) is, at
least in principle, a property of the site (C, J). What happens in practice is
that these properties of sites often have a genuine ‘categorical’ description,
or at least are implied or imply a property admitting such a description. For
example, if C is a (small) category satisfying the right Ore condition and J
is the atomic topology on it then the topos Sh(C, J) is atomic (notice that
atomicity is a topos-theoretic invariant). For many invariants (for example,
the property of a topos to be Boolean, De Morgan, or two-valued), one has
bijective characterizations of the kind “Sh(C, J) satisfies the invariant if and
only if the site (C, J) satisfies a certain ‘tractable’ categorical property” for
an arbitrary site (C, J), which allow a direct transfer of information between
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distinct sites of definition of the same topos. For other invariants, one may
have implications going in general just in one direction, while for going in
the other direction one has to assume that the site is of a particular kind (for
example, subcanonical); as we shall see in section 7.1 below, the geometric
syntactic sites of geometric theories behave particularly well in relation to
such characterizations. Of course, it may also happen be that one cannot
establish for a given invariant general ‘tractable’ site characterizations of the
above-mentioned kind, but that in the particular cases of interest one can
employ ad hoc arguments to identify properties of the site which imply or
follow from the fact that the topos satisfies the given invariant. We shall see
these methodologies in action in a variety of different contexts in the course
of the paper.
As we shall see in sections 7 and 8 below, the level of generality repre-
sented by topos-theoretic invariants is ideal to capture several important fea-
tures of mathematical theories. Indeed, topos-theoretic invariants considered
on the classifying topos Set[T] of a geometric theory T translate into inter-
esting logical (i.e. syntactic or semantic) properties of T, and topos-theoretic
constructions on classifying toposes correspond to natural operations on the
theories classified by them.
To sum up, it is by means of expressing a topos-theoretic invariant in
terms of the different sites of definition of a given topos that the transfer of in-
formation between theories classified by that topos takes place; it is precisely
in this sense that toposes act as ‘bridges’ connecting different mathematical
theories. The notion of Morita-equivalence thus acquires a prominent role in
our context; it is in a sense the primitive ingredient on which the machinery
just described can be put at work. It is therefore natural to wonder how one
can find Morita-equivalences starting from one’s mathematical work. There
are indeed many ways through which one can arrive at Morita-equivalences.
We have already seen that Topos Theory itself is a primary source of Morita-
equivalences, since any alternative way of representing a topos as a category
of sheaves on a site leads to a Morita-equivalence (cfr. sections 4 and 5
above). The logical approach to Morita-equivalences and the problem of ex-
tending a classical equivalence to a Morita-equivalence was already discussed
in section 5. Sheaf representations for various kind of structures should also
admit a natural topos-theoretic interpretation as Morita-equivalences. More-
over, it is reasonable to expect that most of the classical dualities arising in
Mathematics which involve some geometric theory should in some way give
rise to Morita-equivalences extracting the essential features of them.
A natural way by means of which the ‘working mathematician’ can enter
the world of toposes so to benefit from the existing knowledge on Morita-
equivalences and the application of the above-mentioned methods, is the
following: whenever he or she finds a mathematical property of his or her
interest, he or she should try to find a site (C, J) and an invariant of the
topos (C, J) which relates (in the sense of implying or being implied, at least
18
under additional assumptions) to the original property. For example, given
a small category C satisfying the amalgamation property (cfr. section 9.2
below), the property of C to satisfy the joint embedding property (cfr. sec-
tion 9.2 below) is easily seen to be equivalent to the property of the topos
Sh(Cop, Jat), where Jat is the atomic topology on C
op, to be two-valued.
Since the classifying topos of a geometric theory is two-valued if and only
if the theory is complete (in the sense that any geometric sentence over the
signature of the theory is provably equivalent to > or ⊥, but not both), we
conclude that the joint embedding property on our category C, which is a
property of ‘geometrical ’ flavour, translates in the logical property of com-
pleteness of the theory of Jat-continuous flat functors on C
op. This example
shows that common mathematical properties (in this case, the joint embed-
ding property on a category C) may well arise as specializations of abstract
logical properties of theories which are stable under Morita-equivalence (in
this case, the property of completeness of geometric theories) to a particular
geometric theory (in this case, the theory of Jat-continuous flat functors on
Cop). We will come back to this example in our discussion of the topos-
theoretic interpretation of Fraïssé’s construction in section 9.2. Notice the
central role played by the theories of continuous flat functors in these issues;
they indeed have a strong link with classical mathematics, and part of the
reason for this resides in the fact that their axiomatizations directly involve
the objects and arrows of a given category, respectively as sorts and function
symbols in their signatures.
In general, inventing arguments as the one just described is not as dif-
ficult as it might seem, and it will become easier and easier with the time,
as topos-theorists will discover new invariants for the benefit of mathemati-
cians. Anyway, it is the author’s opinion that this should be a participa-
tive effort; as topos-theorists have drawn a lot of inspiration from general
topology in designing the topological properties of toposes, so in the future
they could be motivated in their work by the needs of people working in
any mathematical field. As we shall see in section 7 below, the existence
of topos-theoretic invariants with particular properties can have important
ramifications in specific mathematical contexts; toposes indeed occupy a cen-
tral role in Mathematics, and their use can be strategic in several situations.
The application of the methodologies just described enables one to ex-
tract an incredible amount of new information on Morita-equivalences, and
to establish connections between distinct theories which could hardly be vis-
ible otherwise. In fact, the kind of insight that these methods can generate
is intrinsically different from, if not actually subsuming (it may a bit early
for saying this), that provided by the traditional methods of transferring
information between equivalent theories by using the specific description of
the equivalence. Indeed, in our approach, instead of using the explicit de-
scription of the Morita-equivalence, one exploits the relationship between
the topos and its sites of definition. This is possible because we have an ac-
19
tual mathematical object, namely the classifying topos, which extracts the
‘common core’ of the theories classified by it, and the equivalences between
the theories are essentially coded in the relationship between the topos and
its different sites of definition. In fact, for most purposes, it is only the exis-
tence of a Morita-equivalence that really matters, and we can well ignore the
actual description of it; of course, if one wants to establish more ‘specific’
results, an explicit description of the Morita-equivalence becomes necessary
(in which case, one can use invariant properties of objects of toposes rather
than invariants properties of the ‘whole topos’, cfr. section 9.3 below) but
for treating most of the ‘global’ properties of theories this is not at all nec-
essary (since, by definition, a topos-theoretic invariant is stable under any
kind of categorical equivalence). In other words, we can generate a lot of
interesting insights still remaining at the ‘1-dimensional level’. We empha-
size that there is an strong element of automatism in the techniques just
explained; by means of these methods, one can generate new mathematical
results without really making any conscious effort: indeed, in most cases one
can just readily apply the well-known general characterizations connecting
properties of sites and topos-theoretic invariants (such as for example the
above-mentioned ones for the property of Boolean and two-valuedness) to
the particular case of interest. On the other hand, the range of applicability
of these methods is boundless within Mathematics, by the very generality of
the notion of topos.
The investigation of theories of presheaf type carried out in the author’s
Ph.D. thesis and briefly discussed in section 9.1 below, represents a clear illus-
tration of these principles. In fact, if a geometric theory T is of presheaf type,
we automatically have two different representations of its classifying topos:
[f.p.T-mod(Set),Set] and Sh(CT, JT). And, starting from this dual repre-
sentation of the classifying topos, one can obtain a great number of insights
by applying these methodologies, including a general version of Fraïssé’s
theorem in classical model theory (cfr. section 9.2).
7 Topos-theoretic invariants
We have already explained the role of topos-theoretic invariants in our view
of toposes as unifying spaces which can act as ‘bridges’ connecting distinct
mathematical theories which are Morita-equivalent to each other. But, what
do we exactly mean by the expression ‘topos-theoretic invariant’? By this
expression, we mean any kind of property P of (families of) Grothendieck
toposes or construction C involving (families of) Grothendieck toposes which
is invariant under categorical equivalence of Grothendieck toposes i.e. such
that if a given family of Grothendieck toposes {Ei | i ∈ I} satisfies the prop-
erty P then for any family {E ′i | i ∈ I} of toposes such that for each i ∈ I
the topos Ei is equivalent to the topos E
′
i , the latter family also satisfies the
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property P (the requirement for a construction C is that if {Ei | i ∈ I} and
{E ′i | i ∈ I} are two families of toposes such that for each i ∈ I the topos Ei
is equivalent to the topos E ′i then the result of applying the construction C
to the first family should be equivalent - in a mathematical sense - to the
result of applying C to the second family). We do not require that there
should be a linguistic expression of the property P (resp. a description of the
construction C) in the language of Topos Theory, all that matters is that P
should be invariant under categorical equivalence of toposes. Of course, any
property which admits a linguistic description in the (informal) language of
Topos Theory is automatically a topos-theoretic invariant (as a consequence
of a very general ‘meta-theorem’), but one should not be limited by this
thought in looking for invariants. In fact, we can expect there to be many
more topos-theoretic invariants around than the ones that we can presently
describe in the categorical language that we commonly use for talking and
reasoning about toposes.
Examples of well-known topos-theoretic invariants include: the property
of a topos to be Boolean, De Morgan, atomic, two-valued, to be connected,
to be locally connected, to be compact, to be local, to be a subtopos of a
given topos (in the sense of geometric inclusion), to the the classifying topos
of a given geometric theory, to have enough points, etc. Cohomology and
homotopy groups of toposes are also important topos-theoretic invariants.
As we have anticipated in the last section, most of these invariants be-
have quite naturally with respect to sites, that is we have general charac-
terizations connecting ‘natural’ properties of sites with these invariants on
the corresponding toposes of sheaves. In fact, for most of the ‘topologically
motivated’ invariants of toposes, we have natural characterizations going in
one direction i.e. asserting implications of the kind “if a site (C, J) satisfies
a given property then the topos Sh(C, J) satisfies the given invariant” (we
refer to part C of [5] for a detailed presentation of these results), and, under
specific assumptions on the site, one can often establish results going in the
converse direction (cfr. section 7.1 below). On the other hand, for other ‘log-
ically motivated’ invariants such as the property of a topos to be Boolean,
De Morgan, or two-valued, we have natural bijective characterizations (cfr.
[2], in particular chapters 6 and 9). In section 8, we will focus on a partic-
ular invariant, namely the notion of subtopos, and discuss its relevance for
classical Mathematics.
As we have already remarked in the last section, it is often useful to con-
sider invariants of objects of toposes, in order to establish ‘local’ properties
rather than ‘global’ ones. By an ‘invariant of objects of toposes’ we mean a
property Q of objects of toposes such that whenever τ : E → F is an equiva-
lence of toposes and a is an object of E , the object a satisfies Q if and only if
the object τ(a) satisfies Q (and similarly for families of objects). Examples
of invariants of object of toposes include: the property of an object to be
compact, connected, indecomposable, irreducible, coherent, to be an atom,
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etc. (cfr. chapter 10 of [2] for a formal definition of these invariants).
We have seen that any topos-theoretic invariant can generate, via the
methodologies described above, a considerable amount of mathematical re-
sults. On the other hand, also ‘negative results’ asserting the non-existence
of topos-theoretic invariants with particular properties can be directly con-
nected to relevant results in Mathematics. For example, one might wonder
whether there exists a topos-theoretic invariant P with the following prop-
erty: whenever E is the topos of sheaves ShG(X) on a topological groupoid
s, t : G → X, E satisfies P if and only if the groupoid s, t : G → X is
‘algebraically connected’ i.e. the coequalizer of s and t in the category of
topological spaces is given by the one-point space. An invariant satisfying
the analogous of this property for localic groupoids exists, and in fact it is
the precisely the property of a topos to be hyperconnected (cfr. Lemma
C5.3.7 [5]). On the other hand, no such invariant can exist for topological
groupoids, and the non-existence of such invariant is directly related to the
classical model-theoretic fact that there can be (coherent) theories which are
not countably categorical but which are k-categorical for some uncountable
cardinal k (or viceversa). Indeed, from the representation theorem by I. Mo-
erdijk and C. Butz of Grothendieck toposes with enough points as toposes
of sheaves on a topological groupoid (cfr. [1]), it follows that the classify-
ing topos of a coherent theory T can be represented as the topos of sheaves
ShG(X) on the topological groupoid s, t : G→ X of isomorphisms of models
of T in X, where X is any set of (enumerated) models of T in Set which are
jointly conservative for T. Now, since by the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem the
collection of all models of a countable theory of a fixed cardinality (either
countably infinite or uncountable) is jointly conservative for the theory, the
existence of our invariant P would imply that for any countable coherent
theory T, T has exactly one isomorphism class of models of cardinality k if
and only if it has exactly one isomorphism class of models of cardinality k′,
for any cardinals k, k′ ≥ ω, and this is well-known not to be true in general
(a counterexample is given by the coherent theory of algebraically closed
fields of a given characteristic).
7.1 The logical meaning of invariants
In view of our previous claims concerning the importance of topos-theoretic
invariants for the investigation of geometric theories, it is natural to won-
der whether important invariants on classifying toposes relate to interesting
logical (i.e. syntactic or semantic) properties of the theories classified by
them. The purpose of the previous section is to show that they do. In fact,
this line of investigation has been systematically carried out in [2], mostly
in chapters 6 and 10, where many well-known invariants were studied from
the point of view of geometric theories. The main tool used in these investi-
gations is the geometric syntactic site of a geometric theory. Recall that the
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classifying topos of a geometric theory T can always be represented as the
category Sh(CT, JT) of sheaves on the geometric syntactic site (CT, JT) of T.
Now, this site behaves quite well in relation to the problem of transferring
properties from the topos to the site. Indeed, the Grothendieck topology
JT is subcanonical and the Yoneda embedding y : CT → Sh(CT, JT) satisfies
the additional useful property that any subobject in Sh(CT, JT) of an object
of the form y(c) is of the form y(d)  y(c) for some subobject d  c in
Sh(CT, JT). Thus, since properties of the syntactic site of a theory often
rephrase naturally as syntactic properties of the theory, the process of ex-
pressing topos-theoretic invariants on the classifying topos of a theory T as
syntactic properties of T works in general quite smoothly. In order to illus-
trate these points, we report below some of the results from [2] concerning
the logical interpretation of invariants. We emphasize that these results hold
uniformly for any geometric theory i.e. no particular properties of the theory
are assumed in order to achieve the characterizations. In order to state the
results, we first have to introduce some terminology.
Definition 7.1. Let T be a geometric theory over a signature Σ and φ(~x) a
geometric formula-in-context over Σ. Then
(i) We say that φ(~x) is T-complete if the sequent (φ `~x ⊥) is not provable
in T, and for every geometric formula χ(~x) in the same context either
(φ `~x χ) or (χ ∧ φ `~x ⊥) is provable in T.
(ii) We say that φ(~x) is T-indecomposable if for any family {ψi(~x) | i ∈ I}
of geometric formulae in the same context such that for each i, ψi T-
provably implies φ and for any distinct i, j ∈ I, ψi∧ψj `~x ⊥ is provable
in T, we have that φ `~x∨
i∈I
ψi provable in T implies φ `~x ψi provable
in T for some i ∈ I.
(iii) We say that φ(~x) is T-irreducible if for any family {θi | i ∈ I} of T-
provably functional geometric formulae {~xi, ~x . θi} from {~xi . φi} to
{~x . φ} such that φ `~x∨
i∈I
(∃~xi)θi is provable in T, there exist i ∈ I and
a T-provably functional geometric formula {~x, ~xi . θ
′} from {~x . φ} to
{~xi . φi} such that φ `~x (∃~xi)(θ
′ ∧ θi) is provable in T.
(iv) We say that φ(~x) is T-compact if for any family {ψi(~x) | i ∈ I} of geo-
metric formulae in the same context, φ `~x∨
i∈I
ψi provable in T implies
φ `~x ∨
i∈I′
ψi provable in T for some finite subset I
′ of I.
These notions arise precisely from the rephrasing of invariant properties
of objects of toposes, namely the property on an object to be an atom, to be
indecomposable, to be irreducible, to be compact, in terms of objects of the
syntactic site of the theory; as such, they represent an implementation of the
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abstract methodologies presented in section 6 in the case of the classifying
topos of a geometric theory represented in terms of the syntactic site of
the theory. Specifically, if y : CT → Sh(CT, JT) is the Yoneda embedding, a
geometric formula-in-context {~x . φ} is T-complete (resp. T-indecomposable,
T-irreducible, T-compact) if and only if the object y({~x . φ}) in the topos
Sh(CT, JT) is an atom (resp. indecomposable, irreducible, compact). The
last step to get the link with the invariants on the classifying topos of T is
to relate these ‘global’ properties of toposes to the above-mentioned ‘local’
properties of objects; this turns out to be possible in these cases, and the
outcome is the following.
Theorem 7.2. Let T be a geometric theory over a signature Σ and Set[T]
be its classifying topos. Then
1. Set[T] is locally connected (resp. atomic) if and only if for any geo-
metric formula φ(~x) over Σ there exists a (unique) family {ψi(~x) | i ∈
I} of T-indecomposable (resp. T-complete) geometric formulae in the
same context such that
(i) for each i, ψi T-provably implies φ,
(ii) for any distinct i, j ∈ I, ψi ∧ ψj `~x ⊥ is provable in T, and
(iii) φ `~x∨
i∈I
ψi is provable in T.
2. Set[T] is equivalent to a presheaf topos if and only if there exists
a collection F of T-irreducible geometric formulae-in-context over Σ
satisfying the following property: for any geometric formula {~y . ψ}
over Σ, there exist objects {~xi . φi} in F as i varies in I and T-
provably functional geometric formulae {~xi, ~y . θi} from {~xi . φi} to
{~y . ψ} such that ψ `~y∨
i∈I
(∃~xi)θi is provable in T;
3. Set[T] is compact if and only if the formula > in the empty context is
T-compact.
4. Set[T] is two-valued if and only if the formula > in the empty context
is T-complete.
Other results concerning the logical interpretation of topos-theoretic in-
variants which were obtained in [2] are the following:
Theorem 7.3. Let T be a geometric theory over a signature Σ and Set[T]
be its classifying topos. Then
1. Set[T] is Boolean if and only if for every geometric formula φ(~x) over
Σ there is a geometric formula χ(~x) over Σ in the same context such
that φ(~x) ∧ χ(~x) `~x ⊥ and > `~x φ(~x) ∨ χ(~x) are provable in T.
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2. Set[T] is De Morgan if and only if for every geometric formula φ(~x)
over Σ, there exist two consistent geometric formulae ψ1(~x) and ψ2(~x)
over Σ in the same context such that:
> `~x ψ1(~x) ∨ ψ2(~x) is provable in T,
ψ1(~x) ∧ φ(~x) `~x ⊥ is provable in T and
for every geometric formula χ(~x) over Σ in the same context such that
χ(~x) `~x ψ2(~x) is provable in T, χ(~x) ∧ φ(~x) `~x ⊥ is provable in T if
and only if χ(~x) `~x ⊥ is provable in T.
3. Set[T] has enough points if and only if whenever a geometric sequent
σ over Σ is valid in every Set-model of T, σ is provable in T.
These results show that topos-theoretic invariants on the classifying topos
of a geometric theory indeed correspond to natural and interesting logical
properties of the theory, ‘uniformly’ for any geometric theory; we shall see
some applications of these notions in the next sections of the paper.
In connection with this, we also remark that, since every Grothendieck
topos has a syntactic site of definition (being the classifying topos of a geo-
metric theory), all the invariant properties or constructions on toposes, and
in particular all the results in Topos Theory, have, at least in principle, a
logical counterpart; and, since the transfer of properties from the topos to
the syntactic site and then to the geometric theory works in general quite
smoothly, we can expect most invariants of Grothendieck toposes to give rise
to properties of geometric theories expressed in the language of geometric
logic. As an example, we mention Deligne’s theorem on coherent toposes,
which is well-known to be equivalent to the classical completeness theorem
for coherent logic (in fact, as we shall see in section 9.3, this equivalence
falls under our general scheme for transferring knowledge between distinct
mathematical theories by using toposes).
So (geometric) Logic provides a language in which most of Topos The-
ory, and hence of Mathematics, can be read and - we emphasize - not only
formulated but actually done. This indicates that Logic in general, and geo-
metric logic in particular, can be fundamental tools for solving a huge variety
of mathematical problems. With their work, Model Theorists have already
shown the fundamental impact that the logical investigations can have for
classical Mathematics; we believe that this positive trend will continue in the
future and will be greatly enriched by the contact with the topos-theoretic
methodologies.
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8 The duality theorem
In this section, we discuss the importance of the notion of subtopos for ge-
ometric logic and Mathematics in general; as we shall see below, this is a
topos-theoretic invariant that behaves particularly well with respect to sites;
indeed, the subtoposes of a topos Sh(C, J) correspond bijectively to the
Grothendieck topologies on C which contain J . This enables us to fruitfully
apply our philosophy ‘toposes as bridges’ in the context of subtoposes.
In [2], a duality theorem connecting subtoposes of the classifying topos
of a geometric theory and T and geometric ‘quotients’ of T is proved.
Before we can state the theorem, we need to introduce a couple of defi-
nitions.
Definition 8.1. Let T be a geometric theory over a signature Σ. A quotient
of T is a geometric theory T′ over Σ such that every axiom of T is provable
in T′.
Definition 8.2. Let T and T be geometric theories over a signature Σ. We
say that T and T′ are syntactically equivalent, and we write T ≡s T
′, if for
every geometric sequent σ over Σ, σ is provable in T if and only if σ is
provable in T′.
Theorem 8.3. Let T be a geometric theory over a signature Σ. Then the
assignment sending a quotient of T to its classifying topos defines a bijection
between the ≡s-equivalence classes of quotients of T and the subtoposes of
the classifying topos Set[T] of T.
The bijection given by the theorem is natural in the following sense. If
iF : F ↪→ Set[T] is the subtopos of Set[T] corresponding to a quotient T
′ of T
via the duality theorem, we have a commutative (up to natural isomorphism)
diagram in CAT (where i is the obvious inclusion)
T
′-mod(E)
' //
i

Geom(E ,F)
iF◦−

T-mod(E)
' // Geom(E ,Set[T])
naturally in E ∈ BTop.
Notice that an immediate consequence of the duality theorem is the fact
that two geometric theories over the same signature have equivalent classi-
fying toposes if and only if they are syntactically equivalent.
In [2] two different proofs of this theorem were given, one relying on the
theory of classifying toposes and the other one based on a proof-theoretic
interpretation of the notion of Grothendieck topology (which we shall discuss
below). Anyway, both arguments exploit in an essential way the syntactic
representation of the classifying topos of T as the category of sheaves on the
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geometric syntactic site of T. So this result falls under the general pattern
discussed in section 7.1 of rephrasing topos-theoretic invariants on the clas-
sifying topos of a theory T in terms of logical properties or constructions on
T by passing through the geometric syntactic site of T.
The duality theorem realizes a unification of the theory of elementary
toposes with geometric logic, passing through the theory of Grothendieck
toposes. Indeed, the theorem allows us to interpret many concepts of ele-
mentary topos theory which apply to the lattice of subtoposes of a given
topos at the level of geometric theories. These notions include for example
the coHeyting algebra structure on the lattice of subtoposes of a given topos,
open, closed, quasi-closed subtoposes, the dense-closed factorization of a ge-
ometric inclusion, coherent subtoposes, subtoposes with enough points, the
surjection-inclusion factorization of a geometric morphism, skeletal inclu-
sions, atoms in the lattice of subtoposes of a given topos, Booleanization
and DeMorganization of a topos. The remarkable fact is that the resulting
notions and results in geometric logic are of considerable logical interest. We
shall survey some of them below.
First of all, we remark that the duality theorem has an elegant proof-
theoretic interpretation. In order to describe it, we first need to note that
the notion of Grothendieck topology on C gives naturally rise to an abstract
kind of ‘proof system’. Specifically, given a collection A of sieves on a given
category C, we can define a proof system T A
C
as follows: the axioms of T A
C
are the sieves in A together with all the maximal sieves, while the inference
rules of T A
C
are the proof-theoretic versions of the well-known axioms for
Grothendieck topologies, i.e. the rules:
Stability rule:
R
f∗(R)
where R is any sieve on an object c in C and f is any arrow in C with
codomain c.
Transitivity rule:
Z {f∗(R) | f ∈ Z}
R
where R and Z are sieves in C on a given object of C.
In these terms, the duality theorem yields, for any geometric theory T,
a kind of proof-theoretic equivalence between the traditional proof system of
geometric logic with the addition of the axioms of T, and the system T A
C
,
where C is the geometric syntactic category CT of the theory T and A is
the collection of sieves in the syntactic topology JT of T. Specifically, one
can associate to each geometric sequent over the signature of T a sieve in
the category C and conversely, in such a way that these two assignments are
natural with respect to the notions of provability of the two proof systems
and are inverse to each other up to provability. The ‘closed’ theories of the
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first proof system can be clearly identified with the ≡s-equivalence classes of
quotients of T, while the ‘closed’ theories of the second proof system are the
Grothendieck topologies on CT which contain JT (for more details, we refer
the reader to Chapter 2 of [2]).
Similar equivalences between classical proof systems of geometric logic
and systems associated to Grothendieck topologies arise in the context of
theories of presheaf type. In fact, if T is a theory of presheaf type then the
duality theorem gives rise to a bijection between the (≡s-equivalence classes
of) quotients of T and the Grothendieck topologies J on the opposite of
the category f.p.T-mod(Set) of finitely presentable T-models. It turns out
that this bijection can be made into a proof-theoretic equivalence similarly
as above. This fact has important consequences; for example, it follows
that any quotient of a theory of presheaf type T has a presentation over its
signature in which all axioms are of the form φ `~x∨
i∈I
(∃~yi)θi, where, for any
i ∈ I, θi(~yi, ~x) is a T-provably functional formula from {~yi . ψ} to {~x . φ}
and φ(~x), ψ(~yi) are formulae which present a T-model.
These ‘proof-theoretic equivalences’ are also very useful in practice be-
cause they enable one to work with Grothendieck topologies in order to ob-
tain axiomatizations of geometric theories or syntactic results about them,
and Grothendieck topologies have in many contexts a considerable ‘compu-
tational advantage’ over the classical proof systems. For example, there is a
useful formula for the Grothendieck topology generated by a given family of
sieves (this has for example been used in [2] to establish a deduction theo-
rem for geometric logic) and of the Heyting operation between Grothendieck
topologies (cfr. Chapter 3 of [2] for all these results). An application of
this discourse to the calculation of the (lattice-theoretic) meet of geometric
theories was given in [2], where a natural axiomatization of the meet of the
theory of local rings and integral domains is achieved by computing the in-
tersection of the corresponding Grothendieck topologies on the opposite of
the category of finitely presented commutative rings with unit (notice that
this kind of axiomatization problems are in general far from being trivial).
In fact, this example represents an application of our philosophy ‘toposes as
bridges’ described in section 6; indeed, in this case the invariant is the meet
of two subtoposes, which, looked from the point of view of the syntactic
site of the theory R of commutative rings with unit amounts to the meet of
the two quotients of the theory R, while looked from the point of view of
the trivial site of the classifying topos of R (the opposite R of the category
of finitely presented rings equipped with the trivial Grothendieck topology)
corresponds to the intersection of the associated Grothendieck topologies on
the category R.
Let us proceed to describe other applications of the duality theorem. It
follows from the theorem that the collection of (≡s-equivalence classes of)
geometric theories over a given signature has the structure of a Heyting alge-
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bra with respect to the natural ordering between theories given by ‘T′ ≤ T′′
if and only if all the axioms of T′ are provable in T′′’. Also, it is possible
to derive from the theorem explicit descriptions of the lattice and Heyting
operations on geometric theories (cfr. [2]), by using the explicit descrip-
tion of the Heyting operations on Grothendieck topologies. This is another
illustration of the fact that working with Grothendieck topologies can be
easier than arguing in the classical proof system of geometric logic; indeed,
it would be rather intricate to achieve these characterizations by means of
the traditional logical methods.
In light of the fact that the notion of subtopos is a topos-theoretic in-
variant, the duality theorem allows us to easily transfer information between
quotients of geometric theories classified by the same topos. For example,
consider the following problem. Let T1 and T2 be two geometric theories
equipped with a Morita-equivalence between them; is it true that for any
quotient S1 of T1 there exists a quotient S2 of T2 such that the Morita-
equivalence between T1 and T2 restricts to a Morita-equivalence between S1
and S2? The duality theorem gives a straight positive answer to this ques-
tion. Indeed, the subtoposes of the classifying topos of T1 correspond via
the duality theorem, on one hand, to the quotients of T1 and on the other
hand, since the classifying topos of T1 is equivalent to the classifying topos
of T2, to the quotients of T2. Notice the role of the classifying topos as a
bridge (where the invariant is in this case the notion of subtopos and the
two different sites of definition of the classifying topos are the geometric syn-
tactic sites of the two theories). The kind of insight brought by the duality
theorem in this context is not only theoretical; as we have already remarked,
the bijection between quotients and subtoposes can often be exploited for
obtaining explicit axiomatizations for geometric theories, and in particular
an explicit axiomatization of S2 starting with an axiomatization of S1.
Let us now come back to the fundamental role of the duality theorem in
allowing the transfer of concepts and results from elementary topos theory
into geometric logic.
Open (respectively, closed) subtoposes correspond via the duality to quo-
tients obtained by adding sequents of the form > `[] φ (respectively, φ `[] ⊥),
where φ is a geometric sentence over the signature of the theory, and the
surjection-inclusion factorization of a geometric morphism has the following
natural semantic interpretation.
Theorem 8.4. Let T be a geometric theory over a signature Σ and f : F → E
be a geometric morphism into the classifying topos E for T, corresponding to
a T-model M in F as above. Then the topos E ′ in the surjection-inclusion
factorization F  E ′ ↪→ E of f corresponds via the duality theorem to the
quotient Th(M) of T consisting of all the geometric sequents σ over Σ which
hold in M .
A particularly interesting topos-theoretic invariant which, via the duality
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theorem, leads to important insights on geometric theory is the notion of
Booleanization of a topos i.e. the subtopos of ¬¬-sheaves. Given a geometric
theory T, we call the quotient of T corresponding via the duality theorem to
the Booleanization of the classifying topos of T the Booleanization of T.
The following result (Theorem 6.4.7 [2]) gives an explicit axiomatization
of the Booleanization of a geometric theory.
Theorem 8.5. Let T be a geometric theory over a signature Σ. Then the
Booleanization of T is the theory obtained by adding to the axioms of T all
the geometric sequents of the form > `~x φ(~x), where φ(~x) is a geometric
formula over Σ such that for any geometric formula χ(~x) over Σ, φ∧χ `~x ⊥
provable in T implies χ `~x ⊥ provable in T.
Booleanizations often specialize, in the case of important mathematical
theories, to interesting quotients. For example, the Booleanization of the
theory of linear orders is the theory of dense linear orders without endpoints,
the Booleanization of the theory of Boolean algebras is the theory of atomless
Boolean algebras (cfr. chapter 9 of [2]), the Booleanization of the (coherent)
theory of fields is the (geometric) theory of algebraically closed fields of
finite characteristic in which every element is algebraic over the prime field
(cfr. [4]). Moreover, under appropriate hypotheses, they axiomatize weakly
homogeneous models in the sense of classical model theory (cfr. sections 9.1
and 9.2 below).
Another topos-theoretic invariant that has already proved to be relevant
for classical Mathematics is the notion of DeMorganization of a topos. This
invariant was introduced in [2], where it was shown that every elementary
topos has a largest dense subtopos satisfying De Morgan’s law; in the same
context, the name DeMorganization was used to denote this subtopos. In
chapter 6 of [2], an explicit axiomatization for the quotient of a geometric
theory corresponding via the duality theorem to the DeMorganization of
its classifying topos was obtained, and in [4], the authors proved that the
DeMorganization of the (coherent) theory of fields is the geometric theory
of fields of finite characteristic in which every element is algebraic over the
prime field.
These two examples show that these logically-motivated invariants of
toposes have interesting manifestations in a variety of mathematical contexts;
the fact that they specialize to important mathematical theories is a clear
indication of their centrality in Mathematics.
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9 Examples
In this section we discuss further examples from [2] which illustrate the
application of our philosophy ‘toposes as bridges’.
9.1 Theories of presheaf type
A geometric theory is said to be of presheaf type to be a geometric theory
whose classifying topos is equivalent to a presheaf topos. In other words, a
geometric theory is of presheaf type if and only if it is Morita-equivalent to a
theory of flat functors on a small category C. The class of theories of presheaf
type is interesting for many reasons. One important conceptual reason is
that any small category C can be regarded, up to Cauchy-completion, as
the category f.p.T-mod(Set) of (representatives of isomorphism classes of)
finitely presentable models of a theory of presheaf type T (take T to be the
theory of flat functors on C); as a consequence, any Grothendieck topos is
(up to equivalence) of the form Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, J) for some theory of
presheaf type T. Another reason is that this class of theories contains all
the cartesian, and in particular all the finitary algebraic, theories, and also
many other interesting mathematical theories (for example, the theory of
linear orders, cfr. [6] and [5] and the geometric theory of finite sets, cfr. [5]).
The classifying topos of a theory of presheaf type T is always given by
the functor category [f.p.T-mod(Set),Set], where f.p.T-mod(Set) is the cat-
egory of finitely presentable models of T (cfr. chapter 4 of [2]). Therefore,
by the duality theorem, the quotients of T correspond bijectively to the
Grothendieck topologies on the opposite of the category f.p.T-mod(Set); we
will refer to the Grothendieck topology corresponding to a quotient T′ as to
the Grothendieck topology associated to T′. This naturally leads to the fol-
lowing question: can the models of a quotient T′ of T (in any Grothendieck
topos) be characterized among the models of T directly in terms of the
associated Grothendieck topology? This question was answered affirma-
tively in Chapter 4 of [2]; specifically, a notion of J-homogeneous model
of a theory of presheaf type T in a Grothendieck topos was introduced (for
a Grothendieck topology J on f.p.T-mod(Set)op), and it was shown that,
in every Grothendieck topos, the models of a quotient T′ of T are exactly
the J-homogeneous ones, where J is the Grothendieck topology associated
to T′. If the category f.p.T-mod(Set)op satisfies the right Ore condition and
Jat is the atomic topology on it then the notion of Jat-homogeneous model
specializes in Set to the notion of (weakly) homogeneous model in classical
Model Theory (cfr. section 9.2).
The investigation of the class of theories of presheaf type provided a
splendid opportunity for the author of [2] to test the methodologies based
on her view ‘toposes as bridges’ described above. Indeed, the notion of the-
ory of presheaf type gives automatically rise to a Morita-equivalence; specif-
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ically, if T is a theory of presheaf type then we have a Morita-equivalence
between T and the theory of flat functors on the category f.p.T-mod(Set)op.
In topos-theoretic terms, we have an equivalence of Grothendieck toposes
Sh(CT, JT) ' [f.p.T-mod(Set),Set]. The two sites of definitions for this
classifying topos are ‘different enough’ for a non-trivial transfer of informa-
tion from one to another to be attainable by using our methods. In fact, in [2]
many results of this kind were obtained, culminating in the topos-theoretic
interpretation of Fraïssé’s construction in Model Theory (cfr. section 9.2).
We shall now briefly survey some of them with the purpose of illustrating
how they arise from the application of our principles.
We have already discussed implications of the double representation
Sh(CT, JT) ' [f.p.T-mod(Set),Set]
of the classifying topos of T for the axiomatization of the quotients of T.
The following result provides a link between syntactic properties of a
quotient T′ of T and ‘topological’ properties of the associated Grothendieck
topology J on f.p.T-mod(Set)op.
Theorem 9.1. Let T be a theory of presheaf type over a signature Σ, T′ be
a quotient of T with associated Grothendieck topology J on f.p.T-mod(Set)op
and φ(~x) be a geometric formula over Σ which presents a T-model M . Then
(i) φ(~x) is T-irreducible; in particular, φ(~x) is T-provably equivalent to a
regular formula;
(ii) if the site (f.p.T-mod(Set)op, J) is locally connected (for example if
f.p.T-mod(Set)op satisfies the right Ore condition and every J-covering
sieve is non-empty) then φ(~x) is T′-indecomposable;
(iii) if (f.p.T-mod(Set)op satisfies the right Ore condition and J is the atomic
topology on (f.p.T-mod(Set)op then φ(~x) is T′-complete;
(iv) if every J-covering sieve on M contains a J-covering sieve generated
by a finite family of morphisms then φ(~x) is T′-compact.
The proof of these results consists in the transfer of (properties of) a
particular invariant, namely the interpretation of the formula φ(~x) in the
universal model of T′, across the two different representations of the classify-
ing topos of T′, as the category Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, J) and as the category
of sheaves Sh(CT′ , JT′) on the geometric syntactic site of T
′. Specifically, if
l
f.p.T-mod(Set)op
J : f.p.T-mod(Set)→ Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)
op, J)
is the composite of the associated sheaf functor
[f.p.T-mod(Set),Set]→ Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, J)
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with the Yoneda embedding
f.p.T-mod(Set)op → [f.p.T-mod(Set),Set]
and
y : CT′ ↪→ Sh(CT′ , JT′)
is the Yoneda embedding then there is an equivalence
Sh(CT′ , JT′) ' Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)
op, J)
which sends y({~x . φ}) to l
f.p.T-mod(Set)op
J (M), where M is the T-model pre-
sented by φ(~x). Now, the transfer takes place as follows: properties of the
site (f.p.T-mod(Set)op, J) imply properties of the object l
f.p.T-mod(Set)op
J (M)
in the classifying topos Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, J), which are transferred via
the equivalence Sh(CT′ , JT′) ' Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)
op, J) to properties of the
object y({~x . φ}) in the classifying topos Sh(CT′ , JT′), which are in turn
translated into properties of the syntactic site (CT′ , JT′) and hence of the
theory T′.
The following result, which expresses the fact that the syntactic and
semantic notions of finite presentability of a model (cfr. [2] for a formal
definition of these concepts) coincide for theories of presheaf type is ob-
tained by the same method, by using the invariant property of an object of
a Grothendieck topos to be irreducible.
Theorem 9.2. Let T be a theory of presheaf type over a signature Σ. Then
1. any finitely presentable T-model in Set is presented by a T-irreducible
geometric formula φ(~x) over Σ;
2. conversely, any T-irreducible geometric formula φ(~x) over Σ presents
a T-model.
In particular, the category f.p.T-mod(Set)op is equivalent to the full subcat-
egory of Cgeom
T
on the T-irreducible formulae.
Another interesting result about theories of presheaf type is the following
definability theorem (Corollary 7.2.2 [2]).
Theorem 9.3. Let T be a theory of presheaf type over a signature Σ, let
A1, . . . , An a string of sorts of Σ and suppose we are given, for every finitely
presentable Set-model M of T a subset RM of MA1 × · · · ×MAn in such
a way that each T-model homomorphism h : M → N maps RM into RN .
Then there exists a geometric formula-in-context φ(xA1 , . . . , xAn) such that
RM = [[φ]]M for each M .
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This result again is proved by the method of transferring an invariant
across different sites of definition of a given classifying topos. In this case,
the invariant is the notion of subobject of the underlying object(s) of the
universal model of T and the two representations of the classifying topos of
T are [f.p.T-mod(Set)op,Set] and Sh(CT, JT). The argument goes as follows.
In terms of the representation [f.p.T-mod(Set)op,Set], the universal model
of T can be described as the functor MT in [f.p.T-mod(Set),Set] which
assigns to a sort A the functor MTA given by (MTA)(M) = MA and is
defined for function and relation symbols in the obvious way, while in terms
of the other representation Sh(CT, JT) the universal model of T admits a
syntactic description such that the interpretation of a formula φ(~x) in it is
given by y({~x . φ}) (cfr. chapter 7 of [2] for more details). Therefore, the
theorem follows at once from the remark that the assignment M → RM in
the statement of the theorem gives rise to a subobject RMT in the topos
[f.p.T-mod(Set),Set].
We note that this result is intimately tied to the peculiar nature of theo-
ries of presheaf type. We cannot expect the same theorem to hold for larger
classes of theories; for example, the theorem does not hold in general for
coherent theories. Indeed, the theory of decidable rings (i.e. the theory of
commutative rings with unit equipped with a predicate which is provably
complemented to the equality relation) clearly satisfies the hypotheses of the
theorem for both the property of an element to be nilpotent and for the
complement of such property, and if this latter property were definable by
a geometric formula then each of the properties would be definable by a co-
herent formula, and this can be easily proved (by means of a compactness
argument) not to be true.
We remark that these results which, as we have seen, naturally follow
from the implementation of our idea of ‘toposes as bridges’, are by no means
trivial and, while they specialize to useful results in a variety of mathematical
contexts, they could be very difficult to prove by using traditional techniques.
On the other hand, an infinite number of other results can be derived almost
‘automatically’ by applying the same principles to different toposes and dif-
ferent invariants; the amount of non-trivial mathematical results that can
be ‘automatically generated’ by the application of these methodologies is
simply boundless. These methods represent a new way of doing mathemat-
ics which differs, both formally and substantially, from that given by the
classical techniques.
9.2 Fraïssé’s construction from a topos-theoretic perspective
In this section, we discuss a particularly significant example (from Chapter
9 of [2]) of a result which, although being obtained as an application of our
purely topos-theoretic methods, is directly related to a well-known piece of
Mathematics, namely Fraïssé’s construction in Model Theory.
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In section 9.1 we have discussed applications of the philosophy ‘toposes
as bridges’ in the context of invariants of objects of toposes; instead, the
main result of this section arises from the consideration of ‘global’ invariants
on a given classifying topos.
Before we can state the theorem, we need to give some definitions.
Definition 9.4. A category C is said to satisfy the amalgamation property
if for every objects a, b, c ∈ C and morphisms f : a→ b, g : a→ c in C there
exists an object d ∈ C and morphisms f ′ : b → d, g′ : c → d in C such that
f ′ ◦ f = g′ ◦ g:
a
g

f
// b
f ′




c
g′
//___ d
Notice that C satisfies the amalgamation property if and only if Cop sat-
isfies the right Ore condition. So if C satisfies the amalgamation property
then we may equip Cop with the atomic topology.
Definition 9.5. A category C is said to satisfy the joint embedding property
if for every pair of objects a, b ∈ C there exists an object c ∈ C and morphisms
f : a→ c, g : b→ c in C:
a
f




b g
//___ c
Definition 9.6. Let T be a theory of presheaf type. A model M of T is
said to be homogeneous if for any models a, b ∈ f.p.T-mod(Set) and arrows
j : a→ b and χ : a→M in T-mod(Set) there exists an arrow χ˜ : b→M in
T-mod(Set) such that χ˜ ◦ j = χ:
a
j

χ
//M
b
χ˜
>>~
~
~
~
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 9.7. Let T be a theory of presheaf type such that the category
f.p.T-mod(Set) satisfies the amalgamation and joint embedding properties.
Then any two countable homogeneous T-models in Set are isomorphic.
We can describe the structure of the proof of this theorem as follows.
If the category f.p.T-mod(Set) is empty then T has no models in Set and
hence the thesis is trivially true. We will therefore assume that f.p.T-mod(Set)
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is non-empty. Since f.p.T-mod(Set) satisfies the amalgamation property, we
can equip the opposite category f.p.T-mod(Set)op with the atomic topology
Jat. Our argument is based on the topos Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)
op, Jat). By the
duality theorem, the subtopos
Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, Jat) ↪→ [f.p.T-mod(Set)
op,Set]
corresponds to a unique quotient (up to syntactic equivalence) T′ of T, such
that its classifying topos is Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, Jat) (Note that, conceptu-
ally, the use of the duality theorem essentially amounts to transferring the
invariant notion of subtopos from the representation [f.p.T-mod(Set)op,Set]
of the classifying topos of T to the syntactic representation Sh(CT, JT) of it).
From the technique of ‘Yoneda representation of flat functors’ (cfr. Chapter
4 of [2]), it follows that in every Grothendieck topos, in particular in Set,
the models of T′ are exactly the homogeneous T-models.
Now, the ‘core’ of the argument consists in transferring the invariant
property of a topos to be atomic and two-valued topos from the ‘seman-
tic’ representation Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, Jat) to the syntactic representation
Sh(CT′ , JT′) of the classifying topos of T
′. One can prove that if f.p.T-mod(Set)
satisfies the joint embedding property, as well as the amalgamation property,
then the topos Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, Jat) is two-valued, as well as atomic (in
fact, the other implication also holds under our hypotheses). But if we read
this invariant from the point of view of the other representation Sh(CT′ , JT′),
this tells us precisely that the theory T′ is ‘atomic’ and ‘complete’, which
forces T′ to be countably categorical (cfr. Chapter 8 [2]). In view of the
aforementioned fact that the models of T′ are exactly the homogeneous T-
models, this concludes the proof of the theorem. By transferring the invariant
construction of the Booleanization across the two different representations
of the classifying topos of T, one immediately sees that the quotient T′ is
precisely the Booleanization of T.
Another interesting application of our methodology of transferring in-
variants across different sites of definition of one topos (given in Chapter 9
of [2]) concerns the existence of homogeneous models of a theory of presheaf
type T in Set. As we have already remarked, there is a quotient T′ of T
which axiomatizes the homogeneous models in every Grothendieck topos and
is classified by the topos Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, Jat). Therefore, the existence
of a homogeneous model of T in Set is equivalent to the existence of a point
of the topos Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, Jat). Notice that this latter property is
a topos-theoretic invariant. Now, one can easily prove that if a topos E has
enough points then E has a point if and only if it is non-trivial; and one
can directly prove that the topos Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, Jat) is non-trivial
provided that the category f.p.T-mod(Set) is non-empty. Therefore, under
the hypotheses that f.p.T-mod(Set) should be non-empty, we are reduced
to prove that Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, Jat) has enough points. The interest-
ing thing is that this can be done in many different ways; for example, by
Deligne’s theorem, it suffices to find a coherent theory which is classified by
the topos Sh(f.p.T-mod(Set)op, Jat). In fact, in [2], we exploited the fact
that a purely combinatorial condition on the category f.p.T-mod(Set) guar-
antees that the theory of Jat-continuous flat functors on f.p.T-mod(Set)
op is
coherent.
9.3 Other examples
In this section, we discuss other applications of the philosophy ‘toposes as
bridges’ to questions in Logic.
Recall that for any fragment of geometric logic, there is a corresponding
notion of provability for theories in that fragment; for example, we have
a notion of provability of regular sequents in regular logic and a notion of
provability of coherent sequents in coherent logic, as well as the classical
notion of provability of geometric sequents in geometric logic.
A natural question is whether these notions of provability are compatible
with each other, that is if the notion of provability in a given fragment of
logic specializes to the notions of provability in a smaller fragment (note
that any theory in a given fragment can be seen as a theory in a larger
fragment). We show that there is a natural topos-theoretic way of dealing
with these problems, which exploits the fact that for theories in a proper
fragment of geometric logic one has multiple syntactic representations of
their classifying topos, each corresponding to a particular fragment of logic
in which the theory lies (cfr. section 4 above). For example, if a theory T over
a signature Σ is coherent then we have two syntactic representations of its
classifying topos, as the category of sheaves Sh(Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) on the coherent
syntactic site (Ccoh
T
, J
Ccoh
T
) of T and as the category of sheaves Sh(CT, JCT)
on the geometric syntactic site (CT, JCT) of T. From the fact that the two
Yoneda embeddings ycoh : C
coh
T
→ Sh(Ccoh
T
, J
Ccoh
T
) and y : CT → Sh(CT, JCT)
are conservative, it follows that a coherent sequent over Σ is provable in the
universal model of T lying in the topos Sh(Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) if and only if it is
provable in T by using coherent logic, and that a geometric sequent over Σ
is provable in the universal model of T lying in the topos Sh(Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) if
and only if it is provable in T by using geometric logic. But the property
of validity of a given sequent in the universal model of a geometric theory
is clearly a topos-theoretic invariant, from which it follows that a coherent
sequent is provable in T by using coherent logic if and only if it is provable
in T by using geometric logic, as required.
Another interesting application concerns ‘classical completeness’ of the-
ories with respect to geometric logic. If T is a coherent theory over a sig-
nature Σ, it is well-known that if a coherent sequent over Σ is satisfied in
every Set-based model of T then it is provable in T by using coherent logic.
It is thus natural to wonder whether, under the same assumption that T
be coherent, the same holds for geometric sequents i.e. if any geometric
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sequent over Σ which is valid in every Set-based model of T is provable
in T by using geometric logic. The answer to this question is affirmative,
and naturally follows from the transfer of an invariant, namely the property
of a topos to have enough points, across the two different representations
Sh(Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) ' Sh(CT, JCT) of the classifying topos of T. Indeed, in terms
of the site (Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) the invariant rephrases as the condition that every
coherent sequent over Σ which is satisfied in all the Set-based models of T
should be provable in T by using coherent logic, while in terms of the site
(CT, JCT) it rephrases as the condition that every geometric sequent over Σ
which is satisfied in all the Set-based models of T should be provable in T
by using geometric logic.
Another result which follows quite naturally from the double represen-
tation Sh(Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) ' Sh(CT, JCT) of the classifying topos of a coherent
theory is the following (Theorem 10.2.5 [2]).
Theorem 9.8. Let T be a geometric theory over a signature Σ. Then T
is coherent if and only if for any coherent formula {~x . φ} over Σ, for any
family {ψi(~x) | i ∈ I} of geometric formulae in the same context, φ `~x∨
i∈I
ψi
provable in T implies φ `~x ∨
i∈I′
ψi provable in T for some finite subset I
′ of I.
The non-trivial part of the theorem follows immediately from the remark
that if T is a coherent theory over a signature Σ we have an equivalence of
classifying toposes Sh(Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) ' Sh(CT, JCT) such that for any coherent
formula {~x . φ} over Σ, the objects ycoh({~x . φ}) and y({~x . φ}) correspond
to each other under the equivalence (where ycoh and y are the two Yoneda
embeddings ycoh : C
coh
T
→ Sh(Ccoh
T
, J
Ccoh
T
) and y : CT → Sh(CT, JCT)). If
we consider the invariant property of an object of a topos to be compact,
we see that the fact that the site (Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) is coherent implies that the
object ycoh({~x . φ}) is compact, but from the point of view of the geometric
syntactic site (CT, JCT) the property of y({~x . φ}) to be compact reprases
as follows: for any family {ψi(~x) | i ∈ I} of geometric formulae in the same
context, φ `~x∨
i∈I
ψi provable in T implies φ `~x ∨
i∈I′
ψi provable in T for some
finite subset I ′ of I.
This theorem shows that what characterizes coherent theories among
geometric ones is precisely a general form of compactness.
Of course, all of the above-mentioned results have a version for cartesian
or regular theories in place of coherent theories (cfr. chapter 10 of [2]).
Finally, we note that the well-known equivalence between Deligne’s the-
orem in Algebraic Geometry asserting that every coherent topos has enough
points and the classical completeness theorem for coherent theories in Logic
can be naturally expressed in our framework. Indeed, starting from a coher-
ent topos represented as the category of sheaves on a site (C, J) such that C
has finite limits and J is a finite-type Grothendieck topology on it, one can
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consider a different site of definition of it, namely the coherent syntactic site
(Ccoh
T
, JCcoh
T
) of a coherent theory T (since, under our hypotheses, the theory
of flat J-continuous functors on C admits a coherent axiomatization). So one
has two different representations for the given coherent topos, one of ‘geo-
metric’ nature and another one of logical nature; and the above-mentioned
equivalence follows precisely from the fact that the expression of the invari-
ant property of having enough points in terms of the coherent syntactic site
(Ccoh
T
, J
Ccoh
T
) of T amounts precisely to the classical completeness theorem for
T.
10 Toposes for the working mathematician
In this section, we summarize some of the aspects of Topos Theory, and in
particular of the methodologies that we have described above in this paper,
which should make the subject attractive to the ‘working mathematician’.
We have seen that to every first-order mathematical theory (admitting
a geometric axiomatization) one can naturally associate a classifying topos,
which extracts the essential features of the theory, that is those features
which are invariant with respect to Morita-equivalence. A given topos can
have many different sites of definition, which illuminate different aspects of
the theories classified by it. Topos-theoretic invariants (i.e. properties of
toposes or constructions involving them which are invariant under categor-
ical equivalence) can then be used to transfer properties between theories
classified by that topos. In fact, the abstract relationship between a site
(C, J) and the topos Sh(C, J) which it ‘generates’ is often very natural, en-
abling us to easily transfer invariants across different sites. Moreover, as
we have seen in sections 7.1 and 8, the level of generality represented by
topos-theoretic invariants is ideal to capture several important features of
mathematical theories.
The kind of ‘coding’ (C, J) → Sh(C, J) given by the operation of taking
the category of sheaves on a given site is highly non-trivial; the two ingredi-
ents (C, J) are combined together in a sophisticated way to form the topos
Sh(C, J). The role of topos-theoretic invariants is precisely that of ‘decod-
ing’ the information hidden in a topos, in the sense of identifying properties
of a site (C, J) which are implied by properties of the corresponding topos
Sh(C, J), or describing the result of constructions defined on toposes directly
in terms of the site in a way which is intelligible to specialists outside Topos
Theory. Indeed, while the notion of site is quite near to the common math-
ematical practice, a topos is really an object of a different nature, a peculiar
entity which can be studied by means of specific methods (i.e. those of Topos
Theory) which are not those of ‘classical Mathematics’ (cfr. section 10.1 for
a conceptual analogy which may illuminate this point).
The link between classical mathematics and Topos Theory is given by the
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fact that many constructions or properties naturally arising in Mathematics
can be expressed in terms of topos-theoretic invariants; for example, coho-
mology groups of toposes are topos-theoretic invariants that specialize, in
the case of particular toposes, to cohomologies arising in mathematical prac-
tice (such as for example the usual cohomology of topological spaces, Galois
cohomology, Eilenberg-Mac Lane cohomology, Weil cohomologies), allowing
at the same time enough freedom to construct new ‘concrete’ cohomologies
which can be useful for other purposes.
Now, the advantage of working with toposes rather with other kinds of
entities lies in the fact that - as we have seen in the paper - toposes can
naturally act as unifying spaces allowing the transfer of properties or con-
structions between distinct mathematical theories, thus opening the way to
the use of methods in one branch of Mathematics to solve problems in an-
other. For example, a property of a cohomology group of a given topos could
well be translated, by using a representation of the topos as the category of
sheaves on the syntactic site of a geometric theory T, into some logical prop-
erty of the theory T (similarly, using a site of algebraic nature, one could
end up with a property tractable by the methods of algebra, and so on).
The ‘working mathematician’ could very well attempt to formulate his
or her properties of interest in terms of topos-theoretic invariants, and de-
rive equivalent versions of them by using alternative sites. Also, he or she
could try to express a mathematical duality or equivalence that he or she
wants to investigate in terms of a Morita-equivalence, calculate the classify-
ing topos of the two theories and apply topos-theoretic methods to extract
new information about it (cfr. sections 4, 5 and 6).
Therefore, much research effort should be done to introduce new invari-
ants for toposes which connect interestingly with questions studied by math-
ematicians, and to identify Morita-equivalences (also in the form of establish-
ing general representation theorems for toposes); we hope to have convinced
the reader that, by only using the most well-known invariants of toposes, one
can easily obtain substantial results in distinct mathematical contexts. Site
characterizations should then be sought for these invariants in order to allow
the transfer of properties to be feasible in presence of Morita-equivalences.
We remark that a mathematical theory alone can ‘generate’ a consid-
erable number of non-trivial Morita-equivalences (cfr. section 4); so topos-
theoretic methods can be employed to extract information on a single theory,
without one having to specifically look for Morita-equivalences connecting
that theory to very ‘different-looking’ ones.
In conclusion, Topos Theory has indeed very much to offer to specialists
in any field of Mathematics; by means of the methodologies described above
in the paper, one can generate a huge number of new results in any mathe-
matical field without any creative effort. This unifying machinery has really
the potential to automatically generate results; of course, many of the in-
sights obtained in this way will appear ‘weird’ to the working mathematician
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(although they might still be quite deep) and in fact, in order to get inter-
esting results, one has to carefully select invariants and Morita-equivalences
in such a way that they naturally relate to the questions of interest (as for
example in the case of Fraïssé’s construction). Still, one should bear in mind
that the kind of insights that these methods can bring into Mathematics is
intrinsically different from anything that one could naturally expect. It is
precisely where traditional methods fail that topos-theoretic methods can
possibly lead to a solution (think for example of the proof of the Weil’s
conjectures by Grothendieck and Deligne).
10.1 A comparison with Genetics
The kind of insight that topos-theoretic methods can bring into Mathematics
is comparable to that which Genetics is bringing into Medicine (apologies
are due to biologists for any inaccuracies about their subject that may show
through the next paragraph).
As the (human) DNA embodies the essential features of an individual, so
the classifying topos embodies the essential features of a mathematical the-
ory. As the DNA can be extracted in many different ways (for example, from
different parts of an individual), so the classifying topos can represented and
calculated in alternative ways (emphasizing distinct readings of the core of
a theory). As the DNA is invariant with respect to the particular physical
appearance of the individual at a given time (for example, with respect to
age), so the classifying topos is invariant with respect to particular presenta-
tions of the theory (for example, with respect to a particular axiomatization
of it over its signature). As the DNA of an individual can be studied by
using appropriate techniques, which are not those of traditional Medicine,
so classifying toposes can be studied by using peculiar methods (i.e. those
of Topos Theory) which, although being entirely mathematical, differ from
those of classical Mathematics. As in Genetics one studies how modifications
of the DNA influence the characteristics of an individual, similarly in Topos
Theory one can study the effect that topos-theoretic operations on toposes
have on the theories classified by them. As the role of the DNA is that of a
unifying concept enabling us to compare individuals with each other, point
out differences and discover similarities, so the notion of classifying topos is
a unifying one, enabling us to compare distinct mathematical theories with
each other and transfer knowledge between them.
We hope to have conveyed by this metaphor the intuition behind the
presented results as well as the potential role of topos-theoretic techniques
in the Mathematics of the future.
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